November 27, 2025 – Nairobi | In the sweltering borderlands of northeastern Kenya, where the sun-baked earth meets the shadows of Somalia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda, a chorus of frustration echoes: “What happened to the KDF? Tumekosewa heshima na majirani ni kama hatujiwezi?” The lament—translated as “We’ve lost respect from neighbors; it’s like we can’t handle it”—captures a growing sentiment among Kenyans. Under President William Ruto’s administration and the leadership of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) Charles Kahariri, the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) face accusations of impotence amid a cascade of border incursions, civilian casualties, and internal controversies. From Somali militias in Mandera to Ethiopian troops crossing into Moyale, these incidents paint a picture of a nation on the defensive, with critics decrying a “failed state” where enemies “watch and take notes.”
As Kenya grapples with these challenges, the KDF—once hailed for its role in regional peacekeeping and counter-terrorism—appears stretched thin. Recent deployments for domestic unrest, coupled with porous borders and diplomatic missteps, have eroded public confidence. This article examines the key flashpoints raised in public discourse, drawing on verified reports to assess whether Kenya’s military might is waning or merely navigating an increasingly volatile Horn of Africa.
1. Mandera County: Somali Influence and Jubaland’s Shadow
Mandera County, Kenya’s northeastern frontier with Somalia, has long been a tinderbox of clan rivalries, Al-Shabaab incursions, and cross-border smuggling. Home to a predominantly ethnic Somali population of nearly one million, the county’s pastoralist economy and porous 682-kilometer border make it vulnerable to external pressures. 0 Recent events, however, have amplified fears of “unrestricted” Somali control.
In mid-August 2025, Jubaland Forces—semi-autonomous Somali troops from the Gedo region—crossed into Mandera amid clashes with Somalia’s federal army, establishing temporary positions near Border Point One and disrupting local schools and markets. 9 Mandera Governor Mohamed Adan Khalif and Senator Ali Roba raised alarms over sovereignty breaches, with Al-Shabaab exploiting clan divisions (Degodia, Garre, and Murule) for infiltration via the Dawa River. 9 Kenya denied Jubaland troop presence but mediated diplomatically to de-escalate. 6
KDF patrols have intensified, including medical camps and intelligence operations, but critics argue underfunding and troop shortages—exacerbated by domestic deployments—leave gaps. ACLED data logs over 150 Al-Shabaab incidents in Mandera for 2024–2025, including IED ambushes on security convoys. 9 “The KDF is reactive, not preventive,” says local analyst Fatuma Halakhe. “Somalis aren’t ‘controlling’ Mandera—they’re exploiting our weaknesses.”
2. KDF and Civilian Bloodshed: Orders from the Top?
Perhaps the most damning accusation is that KDF, on Ruto’s direct orders, has turned its guns on Kenyan civilians. This stems from the July 2025 “Saba Saba” protests, marking the anniversary of the 1990 multi-party democracy push. Amid fury over austerity, corruption, and a blogger’s death in custody, demonstrations turned deadly: 31 killed on July 7 alone, with over 50 total by mid-year. 12 18
In a July 9 address, Ruto ordered police to “shoot [looters] in the leg” to “break” them en route to court, branding attackers “terrorists” in a “declaration of war.” 12 17 The UN condemned lethal ammunition use, while Amnesty International decried the rhetoric as “unlawful and dangerous.” 16 KDF’s unprecedented deployment—armored vehicles in Nairobi streets—marked the first post-independence use against unarmed civilians, authorized post-EU/U.S. talks to enforce IMF-backed austerity. 13
Opposition leaders, including former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua, demanded Ruto’s resignation, accusing state-sponsored violence. 17 A soldier’s leaked X post (viewed 1.5 million times) revealed internal discontent: subsidy cuts and State House “cabal” control. 15 While police bore the brunt of shootings—like vendor Boniface Kariuki’s filmed killing—KDF’s presence symbolized a militarized response, fueling perceptions of a force more loyal to the executive than the people.
3. Uganda’s Audacious Rhetoric: From Tweets to Territorial Claims?
Uganda’s “courage” to declare an “invasion” revives old ghosts. On November 9, 2025, President Yoweri Museveni warned of “future wars” over Uganda’s “entitlement” to the Indian Ocean, invoking pre-colonial boundaries and demanding coastal access via Kenya. 26 Echoing his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba’s 2022 tweets threatening Nairobi’s capture in “two weeks,” Museveni’s speech at a Kampala security forum sparked memes and outrage, with new maps redrawing Uganda’s borders to the sea. 24 26
No boots have crossed the border, but historical precedents—like Idi Amin’s 1976 claim to Kenyan lands or 1980s NRA incursions killing over 100—loom large. 24 Kenya’s response: diplomatic restraint, emphasizing EAC integration. Yet, with Uganda’s UPDF entangled in DRC conflicts, analysts see Museveni’s bluster as leverage for port access amid Kenya-Uganda trade spats.
4. Namanga Border: Tanzanian Bullets and Kenyan Silence
The October 29, 2025, Tanzanian elections ignited chaos: opposition leaders Tundu Lissu and Luhaga Mpina barred on treason charges, sparking protests with 500–2,000 feared dead. 31 37 Unrest spilled into Kenya’s Namanga border post, where Tanzanian forces fired on demonstrators—killing two Tanzanians and wounding two Kenyans, including John Okoth Ogutu shot in Ubungo. 30 34
The border closed, rotting trucks stranded goods, and Kenyan youth joined chants against Tanzanian “oppression.” 32 President Samia Suluhu blamed “foreigners,” while Ruto urged dialogue without reprisal. 33 No military response followed, drawing ire: “Nothing was done,” as one X user fumed. KDF’s absence here underscores resource strains from Somalia operations.
5. Ethiopian Incursions: Shots Deep in Kenyan Soil
On November 22, 2025, Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) crossed nearly one kilometer into Moyale, Marsabit County—firing shots two kilometers from the police station. 40 41 Triggered by an alleged Kenyan abduction or Oromo Liberation Army pursuit, the two-hour standoff saw KDF repel the intruders after Kenya Police and Administration Police exchanges. 40 Unconfirmed reports claim an Ethiopian officer killed; no Kenyan casualties, but tensions simmer over disputed boundaries and Borana-Gabra clashes. 44
This echoes 2018 ENDF killings of nine civilians near Moyale, displacing thousands. 47 KDF’s response was firm but contained, highlighting chronic border porosity amid Ethiopia’s OLA insurgencies.
A Failed State? Or a Force in Flux?
Kenya’s Global Firepower ranking holds at 83rd for 2025, with ongoing recruitment (shortlists out October 24) and training like Justified Accord 2025 enhancing crisis response. 59 53 Ruto, at the National Defence University graduation on November 21, touted AI integration and IED training with UK support. 55 Yet, domestic use against protesters and multi-front borders strain the force.
Critics like Gachagua decry a “hostile” regime; defenders point to KDF’s AMISOM successes. As neighbors probe weaknesses, the question lingers: Has the KDF lost its edge, or is this the cost of a multipolar Horn? Diplomatic renewal, bolstered funding, and border tech could restore heshima—but time is short.
Sources: UN reports, ACLED data, Kenyan/Tanzanian media (Nation Africa, Kenyans.co.ke), international outlets (Reuters, BBC, Al Jazeera).
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